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REPLACEMENT COST COVERAGE: A LEGAL PRIMER
Johnny Parker'
Replacement cost coverage protects against a very real and in-
evitable loss not protected by actual cash value policies-
depreciation. Property insurers, early on, determined that, in
order to make replacement insurance economically feasible,
contractual obligations, in addition to those imposed by tradi-
tional actual cash value policies, had to be placed upon the in-
sured. In order to achieve this commercial idiom, replacement
cost provisions were drafted to require actual repair or re-
placement of damaged or destroyed premises as a condition
precedent to the payment of the replacement cost proceeds. In-
surance is affected with a quasi-public interest; consequently,
its providers must always balance the commercial idiom
against the interests of society in attaining coverage. Whether
an acceptable balance has been struck is always a matter ripe
for litigation. This Article discusses the theoretical and practi-
cal distinctions between replacement cost and actual cash value
policies. Thereafter, it examines the judicial interpretations ac-
corded to loss settlement provisions. The ultimate objective of
this Article is to explore the delicate balance struck by the in-
surance industry in the context of replacement cost policies and
the legal implications where the scales tilt too far in favor of the
insurance industry's interests.
INTRODUCTION
The insurance industry has developed two distinct types of
casualty protection for residential and commercial property. The
first protection, actual cash value coverage, insures the premises to
the extent of its actual cash value. Actual cash value coverage,
commonly referred to as basic coverage, recognizes that the insurer
is entitled to deduct reasonable depreciation from the value of the
loss.' The second protection, replacement cost coverage, provides
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., 1982, Uni-
versity of Mississippi; J.D., 1984, University of Mississippi College of Law;
LL.M., 1987, Columbia University College of Law.
1. Three general formulas have been developed for measuring actual cash
value: (1) market value; (2) replacement cost new less depreciation; and (3) the
broad evidence rule. Market value generally means the price agreed upon by
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protection to the extent of the full cost of repair or replacement
without deduction for depreciation.2 Both actual cash value and re-
placement cost coverage provisions are common features of property
insurance contracts.
The primary objective of property insurance is indemnity. "The
actual cash value policy is a pure indemnity contract.' 3 Its purpose
is to make the insured whole, but never to benefit him because a
loss occurred In other words, to indemnify means simply to place
the insured back in the position she enjoyed prior to loss. Since
most property depreciates with time, the formula, replacement cost
new less depreciation, has, from an insurance industry perspective,
become synonymous with actual cash value.5 The concept of re-
an owner willing to sell and a buyer willing to buy, neither of whom is under a
compulsion to act. The criticism of the market value formula is that a building
ordinarily has no recognized market value independent of the land upon which
it sits. Consequently, valuation experts ordinarily rely upon a residual market
value for a structure by deducting from the market value of the whole parcel
the appraised market value of the land. For a discussion of the replacement
cost new less depreciation formula, see infra note 5 and accompanying text.
The broad evidence rule is a flexible formula that "consider[s] all evidence
[that] an expert would consider relevant to an evaluation," including "both fair
market value and replacement cost new less depreciation." Elberon Bathing
Co. v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 389 A.2d 439, 444 (N.J. 1978). For further discus-
sion, see B. David Hinkle, The Meaning of 'Actual Cash Value," 539 INS. L.J.
711, 718-19 (1967), and Note, Valuation and Measures of Recovery Under Fire
Insurance Policies, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 818, 822-23 (1949) [hereinafter Valua-
tion] (citing McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 159 N.E. 902, 905 (N.Y. 1928)).
2. Replacement coverage entitles the insured to receive the amount nec-
essary to rebuild a structure or replace its content in a new condition, without
deducting for depreciation. "Recovery is allowed, in the words of many courts,
on a new for old basis." Leo John Jordan, What Price Rebuilding?, BRIEF,
Spring 1990, 17, 17.
3. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 1982).
4. Traditional insurance coverage was for the actual or fair cash value of
the property. The owner was indemnified fully by the payment of the fair cash
value, which in effect was the market value, because that was what the owner
lost if the insured building was destroyed. See 6 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3823 (1972).
5. See ROBERT J. PRAHL, INTRODUCTION TO CLAIMs 87 (1988). Although the
term actual cash value is found in many property insurance policies, it is quite
common for the phrase not to be defined in those policies. The generally-
accepted meaning of the term "actual cash value" is replacement cost new less
depreciation. Depreciation is the reduction in value of tangible property. Two
kinds of depreciation are recognized by the insurance industry: (1) physical de-
preciation, which refers to wear and tear, deterioration, and decay that are in-
evitable over time; and (2) economic depreciation or obsolescence, which means
a loss in value due to changes in technology, style, or composition of the area.
Not all courts recognize obsolescence as a depreciable item. See id.
There has been much litigation regarding how actual cash value should be
determined and what it means. Consequently, the case law of the respective
jurisdiction should be consulted when attempting to ascertain the meaning of
actual cash value. The broad evidence rule is the most accepted test for actual
cash value. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 439 N.E.2d 1162, 1165,
1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Mamou Farm Servs., Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 488 So.
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placement cost new less depreciation is also compatible with the
principle of indemnification.6 If, for example, an insured's twenty-
five-year-old home is destroyed by fire and the property insurance
proceeds allow her to construct a new home with the same kind and
quality of materials, the insured has obviously been placed in a bet-
ter position after the loss than before. As a result of the new for old
exchange, the insured has experienced a profit from the loss. This
is clearly inconsistent with the principle of indemnification. Conse-
quently, actual cash value provisions prevent the insured from re-
ceiving a profit or betterment by allowing the insurer to deduct de-
preciation from the cost of the new house.
The following example better illustrates the meaning and effect
of actual cash value. Assume a house has a 100-year life expectancy
and is twenty-five years old when it is destroyed by fire. The house
was purchased for $100,000 when originally built twenty-five years
ago and would cost $200,000 to replace today. One-fourth of the
house's useful life has expired. As a result, the replacement cost
new less depreciation equals actual cash value formula entitles the
insurer to take a depreciation deduction of $50,000, or 25% of the
cost to replace the structure. Thus, the actual cash value of the
2d 259, 262-63 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Elberon Bathing Co. v. Ambassador Ins.
Co., 389 A.2d 439, 444 (N.J. 1978); Zochert v. National Farmers Union Property
& Cas. Co., 576 N.W.2d 531, 533-35 (S.D. 1998).
The vast majority of courts agree that not to allow a deduction for the de-
preciation of real property would violate the principle of indemnity. See Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. City of Coffeyville, 630 F. Supp. 166, 169-71 (D. Kan.
1986); Manduca Datsun, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 676 P.2d
1274, 1276-77 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442
N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. 1982); Surratt v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 74 N.C.
App. 288, 293-94, 328 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1985); Ditch v. Yorktowne Mut. Ins. Co.,
493 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Heer v. South Dakota, 432 N.W.2d
559, 565-66 (S.D. 1988); Wendy Evans Lehmann, Annotation, Depreciation As
Factor in Determining Actual Cash Value for Partial Loss Under Insurance Pol-
icy, 8 A.L.R.4TH 533, 537 (1981) (noting that, regardless of the valuation
method used, it is "generally held" that depreciation is an appropriate or requi-
site factor in determining cash value).
It should be noted that some states prohibit the deduction of depreciation
on partial losses. See, e.g., Sperling v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 297,
298 (Fla. 1973); Thomas v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 676, 679
(Kan. 1983); Farber v. Perkiomen Mut. Ins. Co., 88 A.2d 776, 77-79 (Pa. 1952);
cf London v. Insurance Placement Facility, 703 A.2d 45, 49-50 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997) (allowing deduction of depreciation on partial losses). Commentary on
the role of depreciation suggests that
[tihe most striking development in the partial loss cases has been the
emergence of a minority view that recovery may be had for the cost of
reconstruction without any depreciation allowance. The rationale of
these cases is that if a depreciation deduction is taken, the insured
will realize a sum [that is] insufficient to pay for repairing the prop-
erty at the time of loss.
Valuation, supra note 1, at 826, quoted in Travelers Indem. Co., 442 N.E.2d at
355.
6. See supra note 5.
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house and the amount the insured would be entitled to receive is
$150,000, replacement cost new ($200,000) less depreciation
($50,000). As reflected in the illustration, actual cash value, with
its emphasis on indemnification, leaves a shortfall which must be
financially absorbed by the insured if she desires to rebuild the
same structure with the same kind and quality of materials.
Unlike actual cash value coverage, replacement cost coverage
goes "beyond the concept of indemnity and simply recognize[s] that
even expected deterioration of property is a risk which may be in-
sured against."7 Thus, the insured, if she actually replaces or re-
pairs the damaged property, is entitled to the full cost of that repair
or replacement. "Replacement cost insurance ... is not a pure in-
demnity agreement."8 Rather, it is optional coverage which is gen-
erally more expensive due to the nature and certainty of deprecia-
tion, the risk covered.9 The insurance industry takes "into account
the one great hazard in providing this kind of coverage: the possi-
bility for the insured to reap a substantial profit."' °
The purpose of replacement cost coverage has been explained as
follows:
Though the concept underlying the use of actual cash value as
a Property insurance standard is sound, beyond challenge, the
business has for many decades recognized that its strictest ap-
plication can and does leave uninsured a very real source of
potential loss. A property owner may indeed realize a better-
ment through the reconstruction of a damaged building, but
that betterment may be one for which he cannot at the time of
loss afford to pay. In other words, one's building may be, say
25% depreciated at the time of loss, but he needs sufficient
funds with which to replace the building and the depreciation
may represent nothing more to him at that time than an ac-
counting entry. To be prepared for this contingency, he must
have some sort of reserve. Otherwise, whatever the theory-
depreciation, betterment, use, indemnity-this man is faced
7. Jordan, supra note 2, at 17.
8. Travelers Indem. Co., 442 N.E.2d at 353.
9. A further level of insurance is provided by:
[diepreciation insurance, sometimes called Replacement cost insur-
ance, [which] pays for full replacement cost new of the insured prop-
erty, without deduction for depreciation. It provides indemnity for the
expenditures the insured is obliged to make over and above the
amount of the loss covered by full insurance under the standard fire
policy in order to restore the property to its full usefulness as before
the loss or damage. Depreciation insurance substitutes a figure rep-
resenting the cost of replacement new for the term "actual cash
value."
Higgins v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 469 P.2d 766, 772 (Or. 1970) (en banc)
(quoting JOHN H. MAGEE & DAVID L. BIcKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 309
(7th ed. 1964)).
10. Travelers Indem. Co., 442 N.E.2d at 353.
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with an eminently practical problem which may quite realisti-
cally be viewed as an insurable risk of loss.11
In essence, even though replacement cost insurance violates the
principle of indemnity-because the insured receives a better-
ment-its availability is justified because most homeowners simply
cannot afford to pay the cash difference between the replacement
cost and the actual cash value of damaged property. Of greater con-
cern to the insurance industry, however, is the fact that the "old for
new" effect of replacement cost coverage encourages moral hazard. 2
The moral hazard concern led to the development of the most im-
portant limitation to the recovery of repair or replacement cost.'3
This limitation precludes liability under a replacement cost cover-
age provision unless and until the damaged or destroyed property is
actually repaired or replaced. 4
Replacement cost provisions, even in the sole jurisdiction which
found such a provision to violate public policy, are generally con-
strued to be clear and unambiguous." Consequently, the general
11. Higgins, 469 P.2d at 772.
12. Moral hazard is concerned with conditions that would encourage an in-
dividual to destroy or not care for insured property he or she owns. According
to insurance standards, "[moral hazard exists when the insured's character or
circumstances affecting his or her life at a given time increase the possibility of
loss. Pressing financial obligations combined with a chance to profit from an
insurance loss can create moral hazard." PRAHL, supra note 5, at 34.
13. Commentators explain that the reason for the actual replacement re-
quirement is to prevent the insured from making a substantial profit. See 6
APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 3823, at 28 n.66.57 (Supp. 1998). The
possibility of unwarranted and substantial profit is a major cause and signifi-
cant consideration in determining the likelihood of moral hazard.
14. See Huggins v. Hanover Ins. Co., 423 So. 2d 147, 150 (Ala. 1982); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Patrick, 647 So. 2d 983, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
National Tea Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 456 N.E.2d 206, 211 (I. App.
Ct. 1983); Pierce v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Iowa
1996); Smith v. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass'n, 490 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Mich.
1992); Harrington v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (App. Div.
1996); Bratcher v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 828, 831 (Okla. 1998);
Higgins, 469 P.2d at 774; Whitmer v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 410 S.E.2d
642, 646 (Va. 1991); Hess v. North Pac. Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 586, 590 (Wash.
1993) (en banc); cf Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that "the replacement requirement [was] unconscion-
able despite the clear and unambiguous language of the policy"); Reese v.
Northern Ins. Co., 215 A.2d 266, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
15. See, e.g., Patrick, 647 So. 2d at 983 (finding that the trial court erred
"in ignoring the plain language of the replacement cost policy"); National Tea
Co., 456 N.E.2d at 211 (finding that "the policy is clear and unambiguous");
Bratcher, 961 P.2d at 831 (holding that the trial court correctly followed "plain
meaning" of provision); Higgins, 469 P.2d at 774 (determining "the language
employed in the policy under consideration [to be] sufficiently clear"); Ferguson,
596 A.2d at 885 (finding language of policy "clear and unambiguous"); Hess, 859
P.2d at 592 ("We hold that the policy at issue is not ambiguous."); cf. Sayes v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 567 So. 2d 687, 690 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding re-
placement cost provision ambiguous).
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rule that interpretation, construction, or legal effect of an insurance
contract is a matter to be determined by the court as a question of
law6 has been uniformly adhered to in replacement cost coverage
litigation. 7 This rule is probably responsible for the almost uniform
rules of law that have developed in this area. Therefore, the rule
that interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law
should be given considerable attention in planning trial strategy
since this rule effectively shields insurance companies from much of
the uncertainty generally associated with the jury trial process. 8
The rule that insurance contract interpretation is a question of law
also restricts the ordinarily broad discretion of trial judges since
appellate courts do not accord questions of law the same degree of
deference given to questions of fact. 9 Circumvention of this rule of-
16. See Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1329
(Alaska 1995); University Mechanical Contractors v. Puritan Ins. Co., 723 P.2d
648, 650 (Ariz. 1986); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitten, 911 S.W.2d 270,
271 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995); Miller v. American Home Assur. Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th
844, 848 (1996); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Smith, 874 P.2d 412, 414 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Bulaong, 588 A.2d 138, 142 (Conn. 1991);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 152, 155 (Del.
1996); Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1985); National
Tea Co., 456 N.E.2d at 210; Tate v. Secura Ins., 587 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ind.
1992); Pierce, 548 N.W.2d at 555; Farmers Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 839 P.2d 71, 74
(Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Globe Indem. Co. v. Jordan, 634 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Me.
1993); Vizzini v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 A.2d 137, 140 (Md. 1971); Noel v.
Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 119, 120 (Mass. App. Ct.
1996); Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 517 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994); Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 886-87 (Minn. 1978);
American States Ins. Co. v. Broeckelman, 957 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997); Wellcome v. Home Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 190, 192 (Mont. 1993); American
Family Ins. Group v. Hemenway, 575 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Neb. 1998); Wright V.
Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 663 A.2d 1340, 1342 (N.H. 1995); Adron, Inc.
v. Home Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Sheehan
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 658 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (App. Div. 1997); Harring-
ton, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 227; Hanneman v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d
445, 449 (N.D. 1998); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 652
N.E.2d 684, 686 (Ohio 1995); McLeod v. Tecorp Intl, Ltd., 865 P.2d 1283, 1286
(Or. 1993); Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 683 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1996), affd, 705 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1997); Zochert v. National Farmers Un-
ion Property & Cas. Co., 576 N.W.2d 531, 532 (S.D. 1998); Rainey v. Stansell,
836 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 593
S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), affd, 603 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1980); Viking
Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661, 663 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Hess, 859 P.2d at
589; School Dist. v. Wausau Ins. Co., 488 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Wis. 1992).
17. But see Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1990).
Over the objection of the insurance company the trial court gave the issue of
whether the insurer had breached the replacement cost coverage provision of
the policy to the jury. See id. at 664-65. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
See id. at 658.
18. The uncertainty of the jury trial process is viewed by the insurance in-
dustry as an inherent evil to be avoided if at all possible. See id. at 664
(challenging trial court's decision to allow jury to resolve contract dispute).
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ten depends upon the conduct of the insurer in denying replacement
cost proceeds and whether that conduct gives rise to causes of action
other than for breach of contract.20
I. REPLACEMENT COST COVERAGE
A The Loss Settlement Provision
The most logical starting point at which to begin a discussion of
replacement cost coverage would be the loss settlement provisions
themselves. Loss settlement provisions typically provide the fol-
lowing replacement cost coverage:
b. Buildings under Coverage A [residence] or B [other struc-
tures on the premises] at replacement cost without deduction
for depreciation, subject to the following:
19. See, e.g., University Mechanical Contractors, 723 P.2d at 650 (noting
that insurance contract interpretation is a question of law to be determined
"independent of the findings of the trial court"); Miller, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 848
(finding that an "appellate court exercises independent review"); Bulaong, 588
A.2d at 142 (explaining that construction of insurance contract is reviewed de
novo); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 686 A.2d at 155 ("ITihe interpretation
and construction of insurance contracts presents a clear question of law subject
to de novo review."); Jordan, 634 A.2d at 1282 ("We review the Superior Court
decision for errors of law."); Hemenway, 575 N.W.2d at 147 ("An appellate court
has an obligation to reach its conclusions independent of the determinations
made by the court below."); Hanneman, 575 N.W.2d at 449 ("Interpretation of
an insurance contract is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal."); Zo-
chert, 576 N.W.2d at 532 (noting that insurance contract interpretation is a
"question of law to be reviewed de novo"); Rainey, 836 S.W.2d at 118 ("[Olur
scope of review is de novo ... with no presumption of correctness of the trial
court's conclusions of law."); AOK Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860
P.2d 924, 925 (Utah 1993), cited in Coleman, 927 P.2d at 663 (stating that ap-
pellate court must give "the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the con-
tract no deference but review them for correctness."); School Dist. of Shorewood,
488 N.W.2d at 87 (reiterating that interpretation of an insurance contract "is a
question of law which this court decides independently of the decisions of the
lower courts").
20. The traditional exceptions to the actual repair or replacement require-
ment, such as impossibility, frustration, and estoppel, are ordinarily applied by
the court as a matter of law. See Zaitchick v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 554
F. Supp. 209, 215-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (deciding estoppel and impossibility as a
matter of law), affd mem., 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983); National Tea Co., 456
N.E.2d at 210; Bailey v. Farmers Union Coop. Ins. Co., 498 N.W.2d 591, 597-99
(Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing frustration as a matter of law).
However, a legal action against an insurance company for breach of con-
tract-refusing to pay replacement cost proceeds-may also include tort claims
such as fraudulent misrepresentation, emotional distress, or bad faith. These
causes of actions uniformly involve jury trials. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hilley, 595 So. 2d 873, 875-77 (Ala. 1992) (affirming submission of fraud claim
to jury); McCahill v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 579, 582-84 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1989) (affirming denial of directed verdict).
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(1) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insurance in this
policy on the damaged building is 80% or more of the full
replacement cost of the building immediately before the
loss, we will pay the cost to repair or replace, after appli-
cation of deductible and without deduction for deprecia-
tion, but not more than the least of the following amounts:
(a) the limit of liability under this policy that applies
to the building;
(b) the replacement cost of that part of the building
damaged for like construction and use on the same
premises; or
(c) the necessary amount actually spent to repair or
replace the damaged building.
(2) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insurance in this
policy on the damaged building is less than 80% of the full
replacement cost of the building immediately before the
loss, we will pay the greater of the following amounts, but
not more than the limit of liability under this policy that
applies to the building:
(a) the actual cash value of that part of the building
damaged; or
(b) that proportion of the cost to repair or replace, af-
ter application of deductible and without deduction
for depreciation, that part of the building damaged,
which the total amount of insurance in this policy on
the damaged building bears to 80% of the replace-
ment cost of the building.
(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash value of the
damage unless:
(a) actual repair or replacement is complete; or
(b) the cost to repair or replace the damage is both:
(i) less than 5% of the amount of insurance in
this policy on the building; and
(ii) less than $1,000.
(5) You may disregard the replacement cost loss settle-
ment provisions and make claim under this policy for loss
or damage to buildings on an actual cash value basis. You
302 [Vol. 34
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may then make claim within 180 days after loss for any
21
additional liability on a replacement cost basis.
Loss settlement provisions provide for two alternative kinds of
settlements. The first alternative, replacement cost coverage, is ini-
tially conditioned upon the insured satisfying the 80% or more of
the actual replacement requirement expressed in section (b)(1).
Sections (b)(1) and (2) of the loss settlement provision described
above are coinsurance provisions. 22 If the amount of insurance pur-
chased does not at least equal the percentage specified in the coin-
surance provision, the insured is viewed to be underinsured and re-
tains a portion of the risk of loss. Coinsurance provisions, in the
absence of a statute to the contrary, are generally treated as en-
forceable. 23 If insurance in the amount of 80% or more of the full re-
placement cost of the building is purchased, the insured, upon com-
pletion of repair or replacement, is entitled to recover from the
insurer the lesser of: (1) the limits of liability under the policy; (2)
the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for like
21. PRAHL, supra note 5, at 53-54 [hereinafter, this provision shall be re-
ferred to as "Model Settlement Provision"]. It should be noted that the lan-
guage used in loss settlement provisions is in no way uniform and varies from
company to company. Despite this fact, loss settlement provisions regarding
real property, for the most part, provide for the same basic rights, liabilities,
and obligations. The variations in expressions are merely attempts on the part
of insurance companies to clearly and unambiguously set forth the rights, li-
abilities, and obligations of the parties to the insurance contract.
22. It is well established that most real property losses are partial and do
not result in the total destruction of the structure. Therefore, some insureds
play the odds and do not insure their property for its full value. This allows
them to save on the cost of insurance because they are paying for less coverage.
In an effort to avoid this inequity and to encourage the insured to carry a rea-
sonable amount of insurance in relation to either the actual cash value or re-
placement cost value of their property, a coinsurance requirement is incorpo-
rated into many policies. The insured continues to receive the benefit of a
reduced rate when the policy contains a coinsurance provision. If the insured
purchases insurance at least equal to the coinsurance percentage specified in
the policy, the insurer will pay the amount agreed upon in the policy (the
amount specified in subsections (1)(a), (b), and (c) of the model provision) as if
the insured had purchased insurance up to the full replacement value of the
property.
If the insured purchases insurance in an amount less than the coinsurance
percentage, the coinsurance provision limits the amount the insurer will pay to
the larger of the actual cash value of that part of the building damaged or that
proportion of the loss that the amount of insurance purchased bears to the spe-
cific percentage (80% in the model provision) of the replacement cost of the part
of the property damaged at the time of loss (subsections 2(a) and (b) of the
model provision). See KENNETH ABRAHAi, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION
264-65 (2d ed. 1995); PRAHL, supra note 5, at 89-90; 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance §
1510 (1982).
23. See, e.g., Surratt v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 74 N.C. App. 288, 292,
328 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1985); 44 AM1. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1510 (1982).
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construction and use on the same premises; or (3) the necessary
amount actually spent to repair or replace the damaged building.24
The insurer's obligation to pay replacement cost is clearly and
unambiguously subject to two conditions: (1) the purchase of insur-
ance in the amount of 80% or more of the replacement cost of the
building; and (2) actual repair or replacement.' Consequently, the
intent to repair or replace the damaged property, in the absence of
some countervailing conduct on the part of the insurer, does not
trigger the insurer's obligation to pay replacement cost."6 If the in-
sured purchases insurance in an amount less than the specified
percentage of full replacement cost value, she is entitled to recover
the larger of the actual cash value of that part of the building dam-
aged or the amount that the total amount of insurance carried bears
to 80% of the replacement cost of the building.27 The latter amount
is determined by applying a simple coinsurance formula. Suppose
that the fall replacement cost of a house is $100,000 and the in-
sured purchases $60,000 of coverage. The policy requires that the
house be insured for 80% or more of its full replacement cost. The
insured experiences wind damage to the roof of the house. The full
cost to replace the damaged roof without deduction for depreciation
is $3000. The actual cash value of the roof is $2000, replacement
cost new less depreciation.
The actual cash value of the roof is easily ascertained to be
$2000. The typical insurer, however, agrees under replacement cost
coverage to pay the larger of the actual cash value or the fraction of
insurance carried to insurance required; therefore, the latter
amount must be determined. The formula for determining the pro-
portion of the loss that the amount of insurance carried bears to the
amount of insurance required is:
24. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, § (b)(1).
25. See id. §§ (b)(1), (b)(4)(a).
26. See Hilley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So. 2d 184, 190 (Ala. 1990); National
Tea Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 456 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mll. App. Ct. 1983).
An intent to repair or replace without more is clearly not enough to justify the
recovery of replacement cost proceeds. However, where the insured has begun
repair or replacement and the insurer has agreed to make progress payments,
the insurer is estopped from requiring complete repair or replacement as a con-
dition for its continued progress payments. See, e.g., Garnett v. Transamerica
Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 665-66 (Idaho 1990) (holding that, once begun, in-
surer had a duty to continue making proportional payments). Likewise, where
the insurer refuses to pay at least actual cash value, its conduct may estop it
from asserting the actual repair or replacement requirement or may constitute
impossibility, frustration, or fraud, which are also defenses to the actual repair
or replacement requirement. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, § b(2).
28. This illustration was taken from Robert J. Prahl. PRAHL, supra note 5,
at 94-95. For a similar illustration, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW
AND REGULATION 264-65 (2d ed. 1995).
29. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, §§ b(2)(a)-(b); PRAHL,
supra note 5, at 94.
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((Amount of insurance carried) / (80% of replacement cost of
building)) X (cost to repair or replace without deduction for de-
preciation) = Proportion 0
Using the figures from the example above produces the following re-
sult:
($60,000 / $80,000) x $3000; or 3/4 x $3000 = $2250.31
Since $2,250 exceeds the actual cash value of the loss ($2000), the
insurer is liable for the former amount. Had the insured satisfied
the 80% full replacement cost requirement and insured for $80,000,
she would have been entitled to receive the full replacement cost
($3000) less the applicable deduction.32 If either the actual cash
value or the applicable proportion of replacement cost exceeds the
amount of insurance carried, the loss payment is limited to the
maximum amount of liability under the policy.33
Modified coinsurance provisions like these guarantee that the
insured will never receive less than the actual cash value, even if
underinsured.34 If the coinsurance formula here produces an
amount in excess of the actual cash value of the damaged property,
the insured will receive the greater amount, up to the policy limit.
If the formula produces an amount less than actual cash value, the
insured is entitled to receive the actual cash value. The insured's
right to the proceeds under section (b)(2)(a)-(b) is, however, subject
to the actual repair or replacement condition."
The question whether the percentage specified in the coinsur-
ance formula applicable to underinsurance should be calculated
against actual "cost of repair or replacement" or against
"replacement cost" has far reaching implications in the context of
replacement cost coverage. For example, in Boudreau v. Manufac-
turers & Merchants Mutual Insurance Co.,36 the plaintiffs purchased
a house for $33,500. Plaintiffs insured the property with defendant,




34. Only if the insured is so underinsured that actual cash value exceeds
the policy limit will the insured not recover this amount. Note that § b(2) of the
Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, may appear to be a coinsurance
provision,
"but it is not .... In a true coinsurance policy, the insured, if under-
insured, may recover less than the actual cash value of the property;
that is, a penalty will be applied if the insured does not carry insur-
ance which meets a specified percentage of the actual cash value, or
in some cases the replacement cost, of the building."
PRAHL, supra note 5, at 95.
35. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, § b(4) ('WVe will pay no
more than the actual cash value of the damage unless ... actual repair or re-
placement is complete ....").
36. 588 A.2d 286 (Me. 1991).
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with a coverage limit of $95,000.37 Several months later the prop-
erty was destroyed by fire. Defendant initially paid plaintiffs
$24,000 representing the actual cash value of the destroyed portion
of the house.'1 The parties agreed that the cost to fully replace the
farm house with like kind and quality of materials would be
$203,658.58.3' The parties also agreed that the coinsurance clause
of the loss settlement provision pertaining to underinsurance gov-
erned the dispute because the face amount of the policy ($95,000)
was less than 80% of $203,658.58.4o
The plaintiffs never rebuilt the farm house, but instead con-
structed another structure on a different site for which they sought
to hold the defendant liable.4' Plaintiffs spent $58,054 to build the
new house. Consequently, the trial court had to interpret the coin-
surance provision of the policy, which provided "that portion of the
cost to repair or replace ... which the total amount of insurance in
this policy on the damaged building bears to [eighty percent] of the
replacement cost of the building."4' The court concluded that
$95,000, the total amount of the policy, was 58% of $162,927, or 80%
of the "replacement cost" of the building. The court, therefore, con-
cluded that the insureds were entitled to recover $33,671, or 58% of
their actual "cost to repair or replace." The plaintiffs disagreed
with the trial court's determination and appealed."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maine agreed that the "cost to
repair and replace" language in the policy was "distinct from and
used in a different context than 'replacement cost."'" Therefore, the
relevant language did not contemplate that actual replacement cost
would be used in calculating the amount to which the insured was
entitled.47 Thus, the trial court "correctly interpreted the 'cost to re-
pair or replace' provision. . . to mean the amount actually spent by
the Boudreaus to construct their property in Massachusetts."' As a
result, the plaintiffs, because they were underinsured, were entitled
to 58% of the amount they actually spent to rebuild the new home,
or $33,671.12." In contrast, had the plaintiffs' coverage been lim-
ited instead to 58% of the "replacement cost," the insurance com-
pany would have had to pay the full $58,054.
37. See id. at 288.





43. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
44 See id.
45. See id. at 286.
46. Id. at 289.
47. See id. at 288-89.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 288.
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Subsections (1)(a)-(c) of the model loss settlement provision are
measures of liability and not conditions of coverage.0 Thus, as ex-
plained in an often-cited authority on replacement cost coverage:
Moss settlement provisions are best viewed as separate and
apart from the requirement in these policies that liability of
the company beyond actual cash value loss does not occur until
actual repair or replacement is completed. It is best to apply a
two-part analysis. Viewed in this manner, first, the company's
liability for additional funds is established if the insured com-
pletes the repair or replacement. The amount of its liability,
as the second question however, is to be determined from a re-
view of the loss settlement provisions.51
Jordan further explains:
The first [limit of liability], of course, limits the amount avail-
able for replacement to policy limits, while the second relates
to a theoretical or hypothetical measure of loss: that is, the re-
placement cost of rebuilding the identical structure as one
limit of the company's liability. This particular limitation does
not require repair or replacement of an identical building on
the same premises, but places that rebuilding amount as one of
the measures of damage to apply in calculating liability under
the replacement cost coverage. The effect of this limitation
comes into play when the insured desires to rebuild either a
different structure or on different premises. In those in-
stances, the company's liability is not to exceed what it would
have cost to replace an identical structure to the one lost on
the same premises. Although liability is limited to rebuilding
costs on the same site, the insured may then take that amount
and build a structure on another site, or use the proceeds to
buy an existing structure as the replacement, but paying any
additional amount from his or her own funds.
Finally, the third limitation of liability strengthens the re-
quirement that liability of the company does not exist until re-
pair or replacement is made. The purpose of this limitation is
to limit recovery to the amount the insured spent on repair or
replacement as yet another measure of the loss liability of the
insurer. This third valuation method is intended to disallow
an insured from recovering, in replacement cost proceeds, any
amount other than that actually expended.52
50. See S & S Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 617 A.2d
1388, 1391 (Conn. 1992) (finding that this section "addresses the amount of the
defendant's liability rather than" imposing conditions).
51. Jordan, supra note 2, at 39.
52. Id. at 19-21. Several courts have allowed the insured to recover re-
placement cost following rebuilding at a different site. See, e.g., Huggins v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 423 So. 2d 147, 150 (Ala. 1982); Blanchette v. York Mut. Ins.
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The second loss settlement alternative in a typical policy per-
mits the insured to recover the actual cash value of the property
subject to a depreciation allowance.53 This alternative is not op-
tional on the part of the insurer.54 The insured's right to receive the
actual cash value of her insured property is absolute and not subject
to any conditions precedent other than the existence of coverage.
The legal reasoning that supports this rule was explained by the
Alabama Supreme Court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pon-
der.56  In Ponder, State Farm issued a homeowner's policy for
$70,000 on a dwelling owned by Joe and Seretha Ponder." During
the thirteen months between issuance of the policy and the date of
loss "the policy coverage increased to $74,430 on the dwelling and
$40,810 on the contents. On September 19, 1981 the house and its
contents were totally destroyed by a fire.""8 The policy at issue in
Ponder contained a loss settlement provision very similar to that
illustrated above.59
Co., 455 A.2d 426, 427-28 (Me. 1983); Johnson v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 487
N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (Sup. Ct. 1985); see also Smith v. Michigan Basic Property
Ins. Ass'n, 490 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Mich. 1992) (recognizing that actual repair or
replacement is allowed, under the second measure of damages, other than at
the site of the loss.)
53. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, §§ b(2)(a), (4), (5).
54. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ponder, 469 So. 2d 1262, 1266
(Ala. 1985) ("There is absolutely nothing in the policy language . . . that re-
quires the insured to forfeit the actual cash value coverage if he elects to forgo
the optional replacement cost."); Higgins v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 469 P.2d
766, 773 (Or. 1970) (stating that "[iun the usual course, liability under the pol-
icy accrues on an actual cash value basis until repair or replacement has actu-
ally been effected. This means that if the property is not repaired or replaced,
the only liability of the company will be on an actual cash value basis"); Jordan,
supra note 2, at 19 (stating that the "requirement for actual repair or replace-
ment by the insured does not affect the company's liability to pay for actual
cash value loss, but only for the difference between that figure and the higher
replacement cost").
55. See, e.g., Huggins, 423 So. 2d at 150 (finding the insureds entitled to
cash value without regard to the conditions precedent relevant to replacement
cost coverage); Pierce v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 551, 594 (Iowa
1996) (explaining that replacement cost provisions contemplate payment of
cash value before insured complies with replacement conditions); Smith, 490
N.W.2d at 867-68 (noting that insured is at least entitled to cash value, re-
gardless of conduct, in case involving arson allegations); Harrington v. Anica
Mutual Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (App. Div. 1996); Bratcher v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 828, 829 (Okla. 1998) (holding provision for
payment of actual cash value in absence of repair or replacement not uncon-
scionable); Higgins, 469 P.2d at 774 (holding that insured's failure to meet con-
ditions for replacement coverage results in insurer owing only cash value); Hess
v. North Pac. Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 586, 586-87 (Wash. 1993) (holding that insured
who fails to meet replacement condition is entitled only to cash value).
56. 469 So. 2d 1262 (Ala. 1985).
57. Id. at 1262.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1262-63.
[Vol. 34
REPLACEMENT COST COVERAGE
Following the loss, State Farm made numerous payments to the
Ponders for additional living expenses. 60 State Farm also "obtained
an estimate of the cost of replacement from a contractor, one Frank
Shaddix."6' Shaddix estimated cost of replacement at $58,444.84.62
Thereafter, the Ponders "were paid $61,680.77 for the dwelling loss.
This figure included the Shaddix bid, debris removal, and damage
and destruction to trees and shrubbery."
63
Joe Ponder rejected the bid by Shaddix to rebuild the house.64
He also obtained bids from two other contractors, but both were
higher than Shaddix's bid.65 Mr. Ponder ultimately decided to re-
build the house himself.6  At the time of trial, the Ponders were
living in the house and had already spent approximately $30,000 in
replacement cost.6 7 Mr. Ponder testified that he could finish con-
struction of the house for about $15,000.68
State Farm contended that because the Ponders had already
been paid the sum of $61,680.77 on the house loss, which "was
$15,000 more than Ponder himself testified he had spent and would
spend in replacing the house," it had no further liability under the
policy.69 State Farm argued that the applicable and controlling pol-
icy provision was 3c.(1)(c), which stated:
c. Buildings under Coverage A at replacement cost without
deduction for depreciation, subject to the following:
(1) We will pay the cost of... replacement, without deduc-
tion for depreciation, but not exceeding the smallest of the fol-
lowing amounts:
(c) The amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or
replace the damaged building.
0
Thus, State Farm contended "that the only reasonable and logi-
cal interpretation to be placed on these policy provisions is that re-
placement is anticipated."7 ' In fact, according to State Farm, the
Ponders did replace the house. Consequently, they were entitled to
be paid only the replacement cost, "which by [Joe Ponder's] own tes-









69. Id. at 1263-64.
70. Id. at 1264.
71. Id.
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timony was approximately $45,000-$30,000 of which he had al-
ready spent and $15,000 more than he needed to complete the
building. According to State Farm, he was actually paid $61,680.77,
or $16,680.77 more than the amount at which [Ponder] established
the replacement cost."
7 2
The Ponders asserted that they were entitled to the difference
between what they had already been paid and the actual cash value
of the house. "In other words, plaintiffs [argued] that they had the
option of disregarding replacement costs in making their claim for a
loss under Coverage A, the house."'3 Plaintiffs argued that, despite
the conditions set out in paragraph 3c.(1) of the policy, the control-
ling loss settlement provision was 3c.(3), which provided: "You may
disregard the replacement cost loss settlement provisions and make
claim under this policy for loss or damage to buildings on an actual
cash value basis and then make claim within 180 days after loss for
any additional liability on a replacement cost basis."' Thus, plain-
tiffs argued that this paragraph allowed them to disregard the sec-
tion of the policy relied upon by defendant "and to make their claim
on an actual cash value basis. In other words, the plaintiffs say
that this provision applies where an insured wishes to convert his
loss to cash and spend substantially less money in the construction
of another dwelling."75 The court disagreed with the plaintiffs.
According to the court, replacement cost coverage is "optional
coverage" and does not control the insured's right to actual cash
value. 6 Furthermore, no provision in the policy required "the in-
sured to forfeit the actual cash value coverage if he elect[ed] to forgo
the optional replacement cost."7 7 The Ponder analysis is appropriate
because replacement cost coverage contemplates "that, ordinarily,
actual cash value will be less than replacement cost;" consequently,
"[t]he insurer will first pay the lesser amount-actual cash value."78
However, a failure to pay actual cash value as soon as reasonably
possible, after coverage has been determined, can deprive the in-
sured of the funds necessary to begin repair or replacement. De-
priving the insured of actual cash value proceeds can, therefore,
constitute estoppel, which precludes the insurer from insisting upon






76. Id. at 1266.
77. Id.
78. Pierce v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Iowa 1996);
see also American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Perez, 689 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) ("Payment on a replacement cost basis is thus expected to be more
than payment on an actual cash value basis.").
79. See infra Part H.B.
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1. The meaning of "make claim within 180 days after loss"
A loss settlement provision, such as that illustrated above, un-
ambiguously recognizes the unconditional right of the insured to
make a claim for loss on an actual cash value basis."0 It is not un-
common to find, within the same provision, language establishing
the insured's right to subsequently "make claim within 180 days af-
ter loss for any additional liability on a replacement cost basis."8'
On occasion, insurers have attempted to deny replacement cost cov-
erage on the theory that the "make claim within 180 days" language
conditions payments of the proceeds not only upon actual repair and
replacement, but also on the repair and replacement being substan-
tially completed within the 180 day time limit.82 The meaning of
this phrase was addressed by the Supreme Court of Maine in the
seminal opinion of Blanchette v. York Mutual Insurance Co.'
Therein, plaintiff, Timothy Blanchette, purchased homeowner's in-
surance in the amount of $15,000 from Defendant York Mutual In-
surance Company.8 Several months later the house was destroyed
by fire.' Mr. Blanchette elected to take the actual cash value of the
destroyed property immediately and informed York Mutual that he
also intended to claim replacement cost by replacing the home. 6 He
then informed York Mutual that the onset of winter might delay his
ability to replace the structure immediately. In response, the ad-
juster granted Mr. Blanchette a 90-day extension to the 180-day pe-
riod in which claims for reimbursement for replacement cost could
be filedYs
The relevant section of the loss settlement provision of the pol-
icy provided: "You may disregard the replacement cost loss settle-
ment provisions and make claim under this policy for loss or dam-
age to buildings on an actual cash value basis and then make claim
within 180 days after loss for any additional liability on a replace-
ment cost basis."8 9
Plaintiff subsequently learned that the house could not be re-
built on the same lot because of sewage disposal ordinances."0 He
informed the defendant of the situation and expressed his intention
80. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, § b(5) ("You may disre-
gard the replacement cost loss settlement provisions and make claim... on an
actual cash value basis.").
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Blanchette v. York Mutual Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 426, 428 (Me.
1983) (deciding that such provisions do not require substantial completion).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 426.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 427.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 427 n.2.
90. See id. at 427.
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to replace the destroyed house by rebuilding on another lot.9 At
that time, representatives of defendant told plaintiff "that he would
not qualify for replacement cost reimbursement unless he built on
the original lot and unless the replacement structure was
'substantially completed' within the 270-day period (180 days plus
the 90-day extension)." 2
The court in Blanchette was presented with two issues: (1)
"whether the replacement cost feature of the insurance policy ap-
plies only if the damaged structure is repaired or replaced on the
same premises;" and (2) whether the property must be
"substantially completed within the time allowed for making a
claim."93 The court derived its answer to both issues from a literal
reading of the contract. Accordingly, the language of the policy
clearly did not preclude plaintiff from rebuilding on a different
site.94 In response to the second issue, the court observed that
"[t]here is simply no support for the company's argument that the
obligation to make a claim imposes the requirement that the re-
placement building must be 'substantially complete' at the time the
claim is made."95 Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to recover re-
placement cost proceeds up to the policy limits for the house he con-
structed at a different location."
In Bourrie v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co.,9'
the Oregon Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of the mean-
ing of the language "make claim."' In Bourrie, the plaintiffs home
was destroyed by fire.99 The plaintiff had purchased a homeowner's
policy from the defendant that provided for replacement cost cover-
age on the structure.' Defendant paid plaintiff $33,929.50 for the




94. See id. at 427-28. For a detailed discussion of the replacement re-
quirement, see supra notes 3-52 and accompanying text. Courts generally in-
terpret provisions that provide, in pertinent part, for payment of "the replace-
ment cost of that part of the building damaged for equivalent construction and
use on the same premises" as a hypothetical measure of liability and not as a
condition to the recovery of replacement cost proceeds. Johnson v. Colonial
Penn. Ins., 487 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (emphasis added); see also
S & S Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 617 A.2d 1388, 1390-
91 (Conn. 1992) (construing any ambiguity in the application of "on the same
premises" against the insurance company).
95. Blanchette, 455 A.2d at 428.
96. See id. at 427.
97. 707 P.2d 60 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
98. See id. at 63.





with a statement of the full replacement cost of the insured build-
ing 102i . 1°
Plaintiff replaced the destroyed structure on an adjacent site."3
Operating under the belief that the policy required completion
within 180 days, plaintiff still could not complete replacement in
time and the defendant denied replacement cost proceeds.' The
Bourrie court, unlike the court in Blanchette that relied upon the
literal language of the contract, concluded that the policy language
"make claim within 180 days" was ambiguous and unclear.0 5 Con-
sequently, the court noted that "[ilf defendant had intended to re-
quire repair or replacement within a specific period of time, it would
have been a simple matter to so require in clear language."1"
Though the court in Bourrie used a different analysis, it nonetheless
cited Blanchette for its legal reasoning.' 7 Both courts agreed that
the current state of the law is that: (1) the "make claim within 180
days" language merely prescribed the time period in which the in-
sured must apprise the insurance company of his intentions to re-
pair or rebuild; and (2) in the absence of a clear expression of the
time within which replacement must be complete, the law would
imply a requirement that repair or replacement be completed
within a reasonable time.08
2. Does intent to rebuild satisfy the actual repair or
replacement requirement?
The best response to this question was put forth nearly a dec-
ade ago by Leo Jordan in his often-cited article, What Price Rebuild-




105. Id. at 63.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 63 n.3.
108. See Blanchette v. York Mut. Ins., 455 A.2d 426 (Me. 1983); Bourrie,
707 P.2d at 63; see also Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 532 A.2d 686, 689
(Me. 1987) (holding that 180-day period "merely provides a procedural mecha-
nism" and insured has a reasonable time to rebuild); Smith v. Michigan Basic
Property Ins. Ass'n, 490 N.W.2d 864, 868 & nn.14-15 (Mich. 1992) (citing
Blanchette and Watson).
109. Jordan, supra note 2. Some policies contain replacement cost provi-
sions which require that repair or replacement must be completed with "due
diligence." Courts construing such provisions have also accorded the insured,
in light of the circumstances of the case, a reasonable time to complete the re-
pair or replacement. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage
Corp., 565 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying Nebraska law and requiring
reimbursement when insured began repairs five months after fire and com-
pleted them five months later); Ruter v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
178 A.2d 640, 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) (requiring repair or re-
placement within a reasonable time).
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On occasion, insureds have attempted to recover replacement
cost proceeds without complying with the requirement to actu-
ally complete the repair or replacement. Whether a court will
allow an insured to do so, based upon intent to rebuild alone,
depends upon the actions of the insurer in the treatment of the
insured's basic loss. For the most part, if the insured is unable
to rebuild because of actions taken by the insurer, then courts
are likely to find a waiver of the requirement. Otherwise,
courts have firmly enforced the rebuilding obligation.
110
This passage accurately reflects the current state of the law.
However, courts also recognize an exception to the actual repair
or replacement requirement where the policy is ambiguous. For ex-
ample, in Sayes v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America,"' the court ad-
dressed the actual repair or replacement requirement in the context
of a homeowner's policy that provided in pertinent part: "We will
settle covered losses to the dwelling under Coverage A without re-
gard to the limit of liability shown in the Declarations. You agree
to ... repair or replace the damaged dwelling."' Defendant con-
tended that, under the policy, its obligation to pay replacement cost
proceeds was reciprocal to the insured's obligation to repair."' The
court agreed that the plaintiffs were obligated to repair the prop-
erty." However, the issue was whether, if plaintiff agreed to make
the repairs, the repair would actually have to be made prior to pay-
ment of the proceeds or whether the repairs could be made subse-
quent to payment."' Finding that the policy language was ambigu-
ous, the court interpreted the policy in favor of the insured and
ordered the payment of the replacement cost proceeds prior to ac-
tual repair or replacement."6
Intent to repair may also be sufficient if the insurer agrees to
cooperate with or assist the insured by guaranteeing or making
proportional payments toward the repair or reconstruction of the
damaged property."' This result does not depend upon the exis-
tence of a policy provision obligating the insurer to so act. Rather, it
110. Jordan, supra note 2, at 21; see also Hilley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So.
2d 184, 190 (Ala. 1990) ("A mere intention to replace does not trigger the in-
surer's replacement cost payment obligations."); Higginbotham v. American
Family Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that lower
court correctly found intent to repair insufficient).
111. 567 So. 2d 687 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
112. Id. at 689.
113. See id. at 689-90.
114. See id. at 690.
115. See id. at 689.
116. See id. at 690.
117. See Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 665-66 (Idaho
1990) (noting that policy could be read literally to require repair before pay-
ment but that, where insurer began to make progress payments, intent to re-
pair was sufficient to require continuation of payments).
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is based on purely equitable considerations-something in the na-
ture of estoppel."8
3. What constitutes replacement?
The requirement of actual repair or replacement, as previously
expressed, is a condition precedent to the recovery of replacement
cost proceeds. This condition is further subject to the policy lan-
guage requirement that the repair or replacement be complete."' In
other words, payment of replacement cost proceeds is due when the
repair or replacement is completed. Few insurance policies define
the terms "replacement" or "complete." Therefore, these terms are
accorded their ordinary meaning."' Thus, "replace" is commonly
understood to mean "to put something new in the place of."2' The
term "complete" is generally understood to mean "brought to an end:
concluded." 22
118. See infra Part lI.B.
119. See Model Settlement Provision, supra note 21, § b(4) ("We will pay no
more than the actual cash value of the damage unless; (a) actual repair or re-
placement is complete....").
120. Two generally accepted rules of contract interpretation provide that: (1)
when contested terms within a contract are undefined, courts generally give the
undefined terms their ordinary meaning; and (2) when searching for the ordi-
nary meaning of a term, it is acceptable to refer to dictionaries. See, e.g., Ari-
zona Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund v. Dailey, 751 P.2d 573, 575 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (interpreting "employee" according to ordinary meaning); Eott En-
ergy Corp. v. Storebrand Int'l Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 899 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citing ordinary meaning rule and consulting dictionaries); Budris v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 533, 535 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that "words are to be
given their ordinary meaning" and consulting dictionaries to interpret "owner");
Muller v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 682 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("In
ascertaining the plain and ordinary meaning of words, courts often consult dic-
tionaries."); Mikel v. American Ambassador Cas. Co., 644 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994) (applying ordinary meaning rule); Lemars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jof-
fer, 574 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa 1998) ("In determining the ordinary meaning of
undefined terms in a policy, we commonly refer to dictionaries."); Ledbetter v.
Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (La.) (applying "general, ordinary,
plain and popular meaning of the words used in the policy"), amended by 671
So. 2d 915 (La. 1996); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
457 N.W.2d 175, 179, 182 (Minn. 1990) (applying "ordinary meaning" rule);
Hanneman v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 452 (N.D. 1998) ("The
dictionary is a good source to determine the plain, ordinary definition of an un-
defined term."); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 652
N.E.2d 684, 686 (Ohio 1995) (holding that undefined terms in an insurance con-
tract must be given "their plain and ordinary meaning"); Twilleager v. North
Am. Accident Ins. Co., 397 P.2d 193, 194-95 (Or. 1964) ("[Words] are to be given
effect in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning."); Ramsay v.
Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. 1976) (noting that
courts often refer to dictionaries to find ordinary meaning); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 952 P.2d 157, 159 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (consulting dic-
tionaries in search of ordinary meaning).
121. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 992 (10th ed. 1996).
122. Id. at 235.
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Complete replacement does not necessarily require the insured
to conclude all aspects of the transfer of property process. Rather,
the insured may satisfy this requirement by entering into a legally
enforceable binding contractual arrangement, such as an executory
real estate contract. For example, in Pierce v. Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co.,123 the plaintiffs purchased a homeowner's policy pro-
viding replacement cost coverage from defendant. 124  Thereafter,
their home was damaged by fire.'25 Defendant, Farm Bureau Mu-
tual, immediately paid the Pierces the actual cash value of the
dwelling.'26 Under the replacement cost provision of the policy, the
Pierces had to repair or replace the house by September 17, 1992."5
Farm Bureau Mutual extended this deadline to January 19, 1993.128
The Pierces found another house owned by the Martins.20 The
Martins were the parents of Jeri Pierce, one of the insureds. 30 "On
December 18, 1992, the Pierces and the Martins executed a short
form Iowa State Bar Association real estate contract on this prop-
erty."'13' The contract terms called for $40,000 to be paid at closing
on January 3, 1993, monthly payments of $500 for eight years, and
a final balloon payment.132 The Pierces failed to make the down
payment and the monthly installments required under the contract
prior to Farm Bureau Mutual's January 19, 1993 deadline. 133
Despite this failure of payment, the Pierces still sought re-
placement cost proceeds from Farm Bureau Mutual.134 Farm Bu-
reau Mutual denied the claim because the Pierces "failed to spend
any amounts to repair or replace the damaged dwelling before the
January 19, 1993 extended deadline."3 5 The Pierces subsequently
filed suit against Farm Bureau. Several months thereafter "[t]he
Martins served the Pierces with a notice of forfeiture on the real es-
tate contract .... In the notice the Martins alleged the Pierces
failed to make the $40,000 down payment due January 3, 1993, and
any of the $500 monthly payments."36
The court in Pierce formulated the dispositive issues as whether
the insured: "(1) made a bona fide replacement, and (2) actually
spent money to replace the damaged dwelling, thereby triggering
123. 548 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1996).















the replacement cost provision."'37 Rather than treating the terms
"replacement" and "complete" as terms of art, the court accorded
them their generally understood meanings.'38 Therefore, the court
focused its analysis upon the nature of the executory real estate
contract. Concluding that the specific contract at issue was binding
upon the Pierces and Martins, the court noted that execution of
such an instrument conveyed at least equitable title to the pur-
chaser.39 Consequently, the court concluded: (1) "such contracts
satisfy the 'actual and complete' replacement requirement of the re-
placement cost provision;" and (2) "the obligation the insureds incur
by virtue of such contracts satisfies the 'money actually spent' re-
quirement of the provision."4°
The legal effect of the executory real estate contract was the
most influential factor in Pierce. An enforceable executory real es-
tate contract conveys equitable title to the vendee and treats him as
the owner of the property.14 ' Executory contracts, which are prem-
ised on the doctrine of equitable conversion, allow the vendor to re-
tain legal title while holding the title in trust for the vendee.1
42
Most compelling, however, is the fact that vendors under an execu-
tory real estate contract have various remedies against a defaulting
vendee.'
4. Who must repair or replace?
The principle of indemnity, from both a theoretical and a prac-
tical perspective, is the most distinguishing feature between actual
cash value and replacement cost coverage. As expressed earlier, an
actual cash value policy is a pure indemnity contract, while re-
placement cost coverage is not."T  Despite this distinction, in re-
solving the issue of who must repair or replace, courts have chosen
to apply this most fundamental principle of property insurance to
replacement cost coverage litigation.
137. Id. at 552.
138. See id. at 555.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 556.
141. See id. at 555.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 556. Vendors may elect:
(1) [t]o keep good their tender of performance, demand the balance of
the purchase price and sue for specific performance; (2) to terminate
the contract because of the vendee's breach, keep their land and sue
for damages for the breach; (3) to rescind the contract in toto; or (4) to
enforce a forfeiture under the statute.
Id.
144. See supra notes 3-14 and accompanying text.
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The issue of who must repair or replace has shown itself par-
ticularly susceptible to the indemnity analysis.146 The primary ob-
jective of indemnity is to compensate an insured for loss suffered.14
The doctrine's application in the property insurance context, how-
ever, is limited to pecuniary losses. This aspect of indemnification
has been juxtaposed onto the law of replacement cost coverage.
Consequently, replacement cost requires not only a replacement but
also pecuniary loss of money spent by the insured to replace the
property. 48 Otherwise, the replacement cost coverage would en-
courage moral hazard and constitute a contract of wager. 4 1
In Paluszek v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America,60 the court ar-
ticulated the contours of the indemnity analysis. The plaintiff,
Mary Paluszek, purchased a homeowner's policy from defendant.' 6'
The insured property sustained extensive fire damage approxi-
mately ten months later.5 2 Although there was evidence that the
fire was started by arson, Safeco decided to provide coverage."3
Shortly thereafter, the parties disagreed over contractor bids for the
repair of the house. After three months passed without any repair
work or agreement on a contractor, Safeco sent the plaintiff two
checks, one for $36,371.30 and one for $2750.94, together repre-
senting the actual cash value of the property.' This payment com-
plied with the policy's terms, which provided that Safeco would not
be liable for losses exceeding the property's actual cash value until
repair or replacement was complete. 5'
Following receipt of the actual cash value proceeds, the parties
reached an agreement on a contractor's bid to repair the house for
$41,286.56.1'5 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff sold the damaged
house in an "as is" condition without making any repairs or notify-
ing Safeco of the sale.'57 After the sale of the damaged structure, the
plaintiff sued Safeco for [$2164.32], the difference between the ac-
145. See, e.g., Harrington v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App.
Div. 1996) (denying replacement cost proceeds when insured sold house to a
third party who paid for repairs).
146. See id. at 223.
147. See id. at 224 (rejecting plaintiffs claims because he had no "'costs'--he
spent nothing to replace the dwelling").
148. See id. at 228.
149. See id. ("[Without [these requirements], the replacement cost provision
becomes a mere wager.").
150. 517 N.E.2d 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
151. See id. at 565. The policy insured against losses due to fire. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 566.
154. See id. The additional check for $2,750.94 represented the correction of
an error in the original calculation of the dwelling's actual cash value. See id.
155. See id. at 565-67.




tual cash value ($39,122.24) and the agreed cost of repairing the
structure ($41,286.56)." s
Safeco argued that plaintiff was not entitled to replacement cost
proceeds because she sold the premises prior to repairs."9 Because
the plaintiff expended nothing in the repair of the premises, which
was performed by the purchaser, providing her any additional pro-
ceeds would result in a windfall. 6 ' The plaintiff contended that,
since the pertinent policy language limited Safeco's liability to
"actual cash value of the damaged property unless and until actual
repair or replacement is completed" did not specify who was to make
the repairs, she was entitled to the full repair amount. 6'
The court, relying upon indemnity, the most fundamental prin-
ciple of property insurance, concluded that the provision required
that the repair be made by the insured.'62 Specifically, the court ob-
served that the right to be indemnified is personal to the individual
insured and does not attach to the property and, thus, inure to the
benefit of subsequent owners.'63 Property insurance contracts,
therefore, are agreements to compensate for loss actually sustained
by the insured and not those suffered by subsequent owners. Be-
cause plaintiff expended no money for the repair of the premises,
she had not sustained the type of pecuniary loss replacement cost
provisions were designed to compensate.
64
Paluszek certainly illustrates the majority view with regard to
the issue of who must repair or replace. 6 ' However, case law does
reflect some judicial leniency with regards to what constitutes a pe-
cuniary loss. For example, in Machson v. Wausau Underwriters In-
surance Co.,' the plaintiff had purchased fire insurance for a res-
taurant from defendant.'67 Plaintiff owned the premises and leased
them to a lessor who subsequently sublet the premises to another
operator.6 8 The premises were destroyed by fire on October 26,
1982, and plaintiff received proceeds representing the actual cash
value of the loss.
169
Following the fire, plaintiff leased the land to Wendy's Interna-
tional, Inc. 7' In the lease, Wendy's agreed to build a new building




161. Id. at 567-68.
162. See id. 568.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See also Harrington v. Anica Mut. Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App.
Div. 1996) (discussed supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text).
166. No. C.A.85C-FE-103, 1986 WL 8179 (Del. Super. Ct. July 24, 1986).
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money on this new building.171 However, she subsequently sought to
recover replacement cost proceeds from defendant.
172
Defendant argued that the applicable policy provision clearly
required that the plaintiff acutally incur replacement expenses in
order to recover. 73 The provision provided: "The Company shall not
be liable under this endorsement for any loss unless and until the
damaged or destroyed property is actually repaired or replaced by
the insured with due diligence and dispatch."1 4 The court agreed
that this position was literally correct. 7 Despite this literal lan-
guage, the court examined the facts for evidence of payment by the
insured in a form other than actual cash. Thus, the court formu-
lated the relevant question as: "Did plaintiff, in effect, pay for the
replacement, not in actual cash, but by giving up other substantial
rights in its agreement with Wendy's which she would otherwise
have had without the requirement that Wendy's do the reconstruc-
tion?" '7 The court, without the benefit of a detailed record, con-
cluded that "in all probability" the replacement by Wendy's was not
a "gratuity" and that, in all likelihood, plaintiff paid for the recon-
struction by giving up a valuable right. 7 However, rather than re-
solve the case on the basis of its own assumptions, the court denied
both parties' motions for summary judgment.'78 Despite the ulti-
mate ruling in Machson, the court clearly expressed the sentiment
that where the insured retains full title, both legal and equitable,
and the premises are repaired by a third party, something other
than the actual payment of money could constitute a pecuniary
loss.'79
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ACTUAL REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT
REQUIREMENT
Much of the allure of the rule that actual repair or replacement
is a condition precedent to the recovery of replacement cost stems
from the rule's effective balancing of the insured's interest in ob-
taining protection against depreciation with the insurance indus-
try's interest in reducing the risk of moral hazard, unjust enrich-
ment, and fraud.8 ' Equally appealing is that loss settlement
provisions achieve this balance without undue inconvenience to in-
sureds. Though the nearly universal appeal of the rule requiring
actual replacement is beyond doubt, decisional law recognizes that,
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at *2.
174. Id. at *1.
175. See id. at *2.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at *3.
179. See id.
180. See supra Part I.A.3.
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when conduct attributable to the insurance company unduly dis-
turbs the balance between the interests of the parties to the con-
tract, performance by the insured may be excused. Accordingly, the
replacement cost proceeds are awarded to the insured as a remedy
for breach of contract.
A. Impossibility or Frustration
As has been the case throughout the development of the law of
replacement cost coverage, courts have relied upon principles of
contract interpretation to explain those situations in which the in-
sured's performance of the actual repair or replacement require-
ment is excused."' The requirement is usually excused where the
insurer's conduct frustrates or makes performance impossible. For
example, in Bailey v. Farmers Union Co-Operative Insurance Co.,
82
the plaintiff, a single, disabled, mother of two children, acquired a
homeowner's policy from defendant.' The policy provided replace-
ment cost coverage up to $52,000.'84 Following a collapse of the
house due to negligent renovations, defendant's agent sought to
deny plaintiff the insurance proceeds.'85 The policy clearly provided
coverage for loss resulting from collapse of plaintiffs house. How-
ever, upon determining that the loss was covered under the policy,
defendant's agent contemplated using a number of defenses to avoid
paying plaintiff the policy proceeds.' Several months after the
loss, defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff containing a final offer of
settlement.'87 The amount offered to settle the entire claim was
$11,900, the actual cash value of the home less the deductible.' 8
Defendant at all times maintained that plaintiffs claim was doubt-
ful and disputable. 9
Plaintiff subsequently rejected the offer of settlement and in-
formed defendant that she wished to exercise her option to make an
immediate claim for actual cash value and then make a claim
within 180 days for any additional replacement costs.' 9° Defendant
later informed plaintiff "that the actual cash value figure was the
total value of the claim and that Farmers Union would not cover re-
pair and replacement costs."'9 ' Later still, after much correspon-
181. See, e.g., Bailey v. Farmers Union Coop. Ins. Co., 498 N.W.2d 591, 598-
99 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (applying "general principle of contract law" to excuse
actual replacement).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 594.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 594-96.
186. See id. at 595.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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dence between the parties, defendant offered to purchase plaintiff
"another dwelling of like kind and quality... as this involve[s] the
least amount of cost of [our] three settlement options."1 2 Plaintiff
rejected this offer because she wanted to rebuild her home on the
original site.
19 3
As a consequence of defendant's refusal to pay plaintiff the ac-
tual cash value proceeds of the policy and additional living ex-
penses, plaintiff was forced to send her children to stay with friends
and secure temporary lodging for herself with her estranged sis-
ter.94 Plaintiff eventually rented an apartment, and, against her
physician's advice, was forced to get a job to pay the rent and main-
tain the mortgage on the destroyed premises. 95
Finally, negotiations reached an impasse and plaintiff filed suit
against the defendant alleging breach of contract and bad faith."'
During the trial, defendant asserted that plaintiff was not entitled
to replacement cost coverage because of her failure to comply with
the policy requirement that she rebuild or repair the insured prem-
ises within 180 days and make claim for the cost of such replace-
ment.'97 Plaintiff contended that she at all times desired to replace
the structure but was prevented from doing so by the conduct of the
defendant.'98 Plaintiffs desire to immediately replace her home was
sufficiently supported by the evidence. 99 Similarly, defendant's
persistent efforts to deprive plaintiff of the proceeds of the policy
and her right to immediately claim actual cash value were clearly
evidenced in the claims file.00 Concluding that defendant's conduct
prevented plaintiff from rebuilding the house, the court applied the
rule that "[a] condition is excused if the occurrence of the condition




194. See id. at 594.
195. See id. at 596.
196. See id. at 596-97.
197. See id. at 598.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 597.
201. Id. at 598. This is a universal principle of contract law. See, e.g., Zobel
& Dahl Constr. v. Crotty, 356 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 1984) ("[Elvery contract
contains an implied condition that each party will not unjustifiably hinder the
other from performing."). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 cmt.
a (1979) provides:
Excuse of non-occurrence of condition. Where a duty of one party is
subject to the occurrence of a condition, the additional duty of good
faith and fair dealing imposed on him under [section] 205 may require
some cooperation on his part, either by refraining from conduct that
will prevent or hinder the occurrence of that condition or by taking af-
firmative steps to cause its occurrence.. . . Under this Section it has
the further effect of excusing the non-occurrence of the condition it-
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Instances in which courts have excused performance of the con-
dition precedent of repair and replacement are factually similar.
2 2
Courts typically excuse performance if the insurer wrongfully with-
holds payment of the actual cash value proceeds and engages in
conduct that: (1) manifests a callous disregard of the insured's
rights under the policy;203 (2) is extreme or outrageous and designed
to deprive the insured of its rights under the policy;20 4 or (3) mani-
fests an absence of good faith.05 Ultimately, whether performance
of the condition precedent is excused depends upon whether the in-
surer acted in good faith during the claims process.0 Good faith on
the part of the insurer operates as an adhesive. 27 This adhesive
binds the parties to the terms of the agreement even though it may
later be determined that the insurer was wrong by initially deter-
mining that the insured's loss was not covered by the policy.
2 8
B. Estoppel
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to prevent the party
against whom it is asserted from taking an unconscionable, unjust,
or inequitable advantage of his own wrong by asserting an other-
wise valid legal right.209 The existence of estoppel depends upon the
facts of the individual case and is ordinarily treated as a question of
fact for the jury to determine.21 The party asserting equitable es-
toppel must prove that the party to be estopped had:
self, so that performance of the duty that was originally subject to its
occurrence can become due in spite of its non-occurrence. The rule
stated in this Section only applies, however, where the lack of coop-
eration constitutes a breach, either of a duty imposed by the terms of
the agreement itself or of a duty imposed by a term supplied by the
court.
Id. (citation omitted).
202. See, e.g., Zaitchick v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 554 F. Supp. 209,
217 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Miceli, 518 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); McCahill v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Pollock v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 423 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
203. See, e.g., Zaitchick, 554 F. Supp. at 217; Miceli, 518 N.E.2d at 362.
204. See, e.g., McCahill, 446 N.W.2d at 582-83.
205. See, e.g., Pollock, 423 N.W.2d at 237.
206. See, e.g., Smith v. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass'n, 490 N.W.2d 864,
867-68 (Mich. 1992). The Smith holding has been superseded by statute. See
Salesin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 581 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998).
207. See Smith, 581 N.W.2d at 787.
208. See id.
209. See 28 Am. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 35 (1966).
210. As a general rule, the question of estoppel is for the jury, and it is only
when the facts are undisputed and the inferences therefrom are plain and inca-
pable of reasonable doubt or difference of opinion that it may be a question of
law for the court. See, e.g., Taylor v. Waters, 477 So. 2d 441, 443 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985); Morgan v. Hays, 426 P.2d 647, 655 (Ariz. 1967) (en banc) (stating waiver
is a question of fact for the jury); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aceves, 233 Cal. App.
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(1) [acted in a manner] which amounts to a false representa-
tion or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is cal-
culated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise
than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subse-
quently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the ex-
pectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influ-
ence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge,• 211
actual or constructive, of the real facts.
The party claiming estoppel must also show proof that he himself
had:
(1) [a] lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question; (2) reli[ed], in good faith, upon
the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3)
action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to
change the position or status of the party2 claiming the estop-
pel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
The decisional law regarding replacement cost coverage reflects
that the same facts supporting the impossibility or frustration ex-
ception to the actual repair or replacement requirement would also
support the existence of an estoppel claim. This may explain the
absence of decisional law in which courts have relied upon estoppel
as the basis for their decision. In the single case where estoppel
was expressly asserted by the plaintiff, Zaitchick v. American Mo-
3d 544, 556 (Ct. App. 1991); Duren, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 709 P.2d 74, 76
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 586 A.2d
567, 572 (Conn. 1991); United Sec. Corp. v. Verene, 193 A.2d 429, 431 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1963); Six L's Packing Co. v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 268 So.
2d 560, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Pantle v. Industrial Comm'n, 335 N.E.2d
491, 494 (Ill. 1975); Lee v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 373 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978); Sprowl v. Eddy, 547 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Bowen v.
Westerhaus, 578 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Kan. 1978); McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d
102, 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Campione v. Wilson, 661 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Mass.
1996); L & H Transp., Inc. v. Drew Agency, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn.
1987); Olszak v. Peerless Ins. Co., 406 A.2d 711, 714 (N.H. 1979); Jersey Dis-
count Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 25 A.2d 506, 507 (N.J. 1942); Western Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 504 P.2d 17, 20 (N.M. 1972); Reeve v. General Accident
Ins. Co., 658 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (1997); Brendle v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 76
N.C. App. 271, 277, 332 S.E.2d 515, 519 (1985); Hanson v. Cincinnati Life Ins.
Co., 571 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1997); Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. Stan-
Ann Oil Co., 603 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
211. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 35.
212. Id; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Taylor, 370 So. 2d 1040,
1042 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (stating the party claiming estoppel must also show
proof that he had: (1) a lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question; (2) relied, in good faith, upon the conduct or
statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon
of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the
estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice); Home v. Exum, 419 S.E.2d 147,
148-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
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torists Insurance Co.,213 the court based its determination that the
actual repair or replacement requirement was excused on the theory
of impossibility, and not on estoppel.214 Furthermore, of the cases
cited in one of the leading replacement cost coverage commentaries
supporting estoppel, all but one were actually based on frustration
or impossibility.2 5 In the single exception, Maine Mutual Fire In-
surance Co. v. Watson,216 the court failed to articulate any doctrinal
basis for its decision to excuse the insured's performance of the con-
dition precedent of actual repair.
217
In Maine Mutual, the insurer engaged in conduct designed to
prevent the insured from asserting his right to replacement cost
coverage.218 The insurer's conduct included "the blatant misrepre-
sentation of the policy language."219 This conduct led the insured to
believe that he had to rebuild completely or replace the home within
180 days of the fire or otherwise forfeit his replacement cost claim.2 0
Likewise, the insurer attempted initially to deny the insured his
right to actual cash value proceeds.221 In the words of the court, "[t]o
agree with the [insurer] would be to allow a party to take advantage
of his own wrong, which we will not countenance."222 This observa-
tion bespeaks of equitable considerations that support the conclu-
sion that the court implicitly based its ultimate decision on the
principle of estoppel. However, neither estoppel nor impossibility
was expressly articulated as the rationale for the case.
Though the same facts can serve as the basis for application of
both the estoppel and impossibility exceptions, neither doctrine
renders the other superfluous. Each principle is distinct. Estoppel
requires a much higher threshold of proof than impossibility. How-
ever, estoppel is attractive because it is ordinarily treated as a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine.223 Consequently, the assertion
of estoppel might entitle the insured to a jury trial.224
213. 554 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
214. See id. at 217.
215. See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Property
Insurance Provision Permitting Recovery of Replacement Cost of Property, 1
A.L.R.5th 817, § 13a (1992).
216. 532 A.2d 686 (Me. 1987).
217. See id. at 688.
218. Id. at 689.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 687.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 689.
223. See Messick v. Star Enter., 655 A.2d 1209, 1211 (Del. 1995), affd, No.
130,1998, 1998 WL 986035 (Del. Nov. 30, 1998).
224. See supra note 20 (comparing questions of law and questions of fact).
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C. Unconscionability
Courts are ordinarily only concerned with the legality of con-
tracts.2= Consequently, a contract containing clear and unambigu-
ous language, which is not the result of fraud, duress, undue influ-
ence, or mistake, is usually enforced according to its terms.
Nevertheless, courts are not powerless and, if the circumstances of
the case require, may ignore this rule and examine the wisdom and
fairness of a contract. A court may refuse to enforce a contract or
any clause contained therein if it determines that the contract or
clause was unconscionable at the time it was made.Y6
An unconscionable contract is one that no person "in his senses
and not under delusion would make.., and [that] no honest and
fair man would accept."27 The doctrine of unconscionability allows
the court to rule directly on the validity of the contract, or clause
therein, without having "to avoid unconscionable results by inter-
pretation."2  A contract is unconscionable if two conditions exist:
(1) one of the parties to the contract lacked a meaningful choice
about whether to accept the provision in question; and (2) the chal-
lenged provision unreasonably favors the other party.229 The appli-
cability of unconscionability to replacement cost coverage was first
-examined by the court in Ferguson v. Lakeland Mutual Insurance
Co." ° In Ferguson, the plaintiffs' organ was destroyed when struck
by lightning.2 1 Plaintiffs subsequently filed a claim with defendant
for destruction of the organ under their homeowner's policy.232 De-
fendant disputed the claim and the plaintiffs were forced to file
suit.2
3
The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the policy provi-
sion requiring the plaintiffs to actually repair or replace the organ
before receiving the replacement value of the organ.234 The court
further observed that this "provision [was] oppressive and unfair
since it required [plaintiffs] to expend a large sum of money prior to
a liability determination."235 The jury ultimately returned a verdict
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant in the amount of
225. See Joseph v. Donover Co., 261 F.2d 812, 824 (9th Cir. 1958).
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
227. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889). Similarly, see Lloyd
v. Service Corp., 453 So. 2d 735, 739 (Ala. 1984) and Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548
P.2d 1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976).
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a.
229. See id. § 208 cmt. d.; see also Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540
So. 2d 713, 716 (Ala. 1989); Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226
(Okla 1988); Koval v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 487, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987).
230. 596 A.2d 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).







$23,317.40.236 The parties agreed that the actual cash value of the
organ was $5700.2 7
On appeal, the defendant argued that a court could not refuse
to enforce a clear and unambiguous replacement coverage provi-
sion."3 The appellate court agreed with this contention as the basic
proposition. However, it observed that "a court may on occasion be
justified in deviating from the plain language of a contract of insur-
ance."239 According to the court of appeals, a finding that a contract,
or one of its provisions, is unconscionable would support a decision
to deviate from otherwise clear and unambiguous language.240
Whether a contract is unconscionable is a question of law to be
determined by the court.241 The Ferguson court was guided in its
decision by the two-pronged test previously expressed, a lack of
meaningful choice and a provision unreasonably favoring a party
24 2
To find a lack of a meaningful choice about whether to accept the
contract, the court observed that insurance policies are essentially
adhesion contracts.243 The court expressed that the definitive char-
acteristic of such contracts is the weaker party's lack of a realistic
choice as to its terms.24 The court also found that the challenged
provision unreasonably favors the other party since the insurer de-
nied liability and the insureds were faced with the dilemma of ei-
ther accepting the lower actual cash value of the organ or expending
a large sum of money in replacement costs without a guarantee of
reimbursement.24' Accordingly, the replacement cost provision in
question was unconscionable and, thus, void as a matter of public
policy.
246
Unconscionability, unlike impossibility and estoppel, has never
been sanctioned as a reason for excusing the actual repair or re-
placement requirement by the court of last resort in any jurisdic-
tion. Furthermore, only one other appellate court has used uncon-
scionability to avoid the condition precedent of actual repair or
replacement. 47  That decision was subsequently overruled by the




239. Id. at 885.
240. See id.
241. See id.; RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. f(1981).
242. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.




247. See Coblentz v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 938,
940 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995), overruled by Bratcher v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
961 P.2d 828 (Okla. 1998).
248. See Bratcher, 961 P.2d at 831.
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ity as a grounds for excusing performance of the condition precedent
of actual repair or replacement is uncertain.
D. Ambiguity
Ambiguity is one of the oldest and most implemented variance
principles." The rule of ambiguity is simply that an ambiguity in
an insurance policy will be construed against its drafter and in fa-
vor of the non-drafting party.20 A contract is ambiguous when a
word, phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible to,
more than one reasonable interpretation when the policy is read as
a whole.21 Ambiguity in an insurance contract can arise from three
sources: (1) inconsistent policy provisions; 2 2 (2) policy organiza-
tion;25" and (3) ambiguous language. Whether an ambiguity exists
249. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES §6.3,
at 628 (2d ed. 1988).
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. General Reinsurance Corp., 949
F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying New York substantive law); Federated
Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 439 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); Del-
gado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 271 (Ct. App. 1984); Na-
tional Cas. Co. v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741, 746 (Colo. 1992);
Murr v. Selag Corp., 747 P.2d 1302, 1310 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 754 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Union Ins.
Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Neb. 1995); Graber v. Engstrom,
384 N.W.2d 307, 309 (N.D. 1986); Weisman v. Green Tree Ins. Co., 670 A.2d
160, 161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Gredig v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 891
S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel,
243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1951); Baehmer v. Viking Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 1113,
1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Pilling v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 500
S.E.2d 870, 872 (W. Va. 1997).
252. See, e.g., Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d 143, 151
(Ala. 1975); Home Indem. Co. v. City of Marianna, 761 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ark.
1988); Coit v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 168 P.2d 163, 169 (Cal. 1946);
Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. State, 714 A.2d 1230, 1237 (Conn. 1998); Reli-
ance Life Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 197 So. 723, 727-28 (Fla. 1940) (Brown, J., dissent-
ing); Davis v. United Am. Life Ins. Co., 111 S.E.2d 488, 492 (Ga. 1959); Na-
tional Discount Shoes, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 1166, 1171 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981); Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Kan. 1998); Auto Club
Ins. Ass'n v. DeLaGarza, 444 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Mich. 1989); Rusthoven v.
Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Minn. 1986); Oleson v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 605 P.2d 166, 169 (Mont. 1980); American Shops, Inc. v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 97 A.2d 513, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1953); American
Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 301 N.C. 138, 150, 271 S.E.2d 46, 53 (1980);
C.P.A. Co. v. Jones, 263 P.2d 731, 734 (Okla. 1953); Elliot Leases Cars, Inc. v.
Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977); Marson Coal Co. v. Insurance Co., 210
S.E.2d 747, 750 (W. Va. 1974).
253. See, e.g., McRaven v. F-Stop Photo Labs, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 365 A.2d 744, 746
(N.H. 1976).
254. See, e.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839-40 (2d Cir.
1981); Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34
(Minn. 1979); see also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 249.
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is a question of law.25 The determination that an ambiguity exists
as a result of inconsistent policy provisions or poor policy organiza-
tion requires little more than an examination of the entire policy
and application of the controlling rule."6 However, determining
whether policy language is ambiguous requires the application of a
detailed legal analysis.
As expressed earlier, the interpretation of an insurance con-
tract is primarily the responsibility of the court. In performance of
this responsibility, courts are guided by the most fundamental prin-
ciple of contract interpretation, that "[an insurance contract should
be construed to carry out the intention of the parties, and that in-
tention should be ascertained, if possible, from the language in the
policy alone.""7 This is the supreme rule and all other rules of con-
struction are subservient to it.
258
Consequently, ambiguity, no matter the source, "should first be
resolved by giving effect to the intention of the parties."259 If the in-
tention of the parties can be ascertained, the court should not con-
255. See Columbia Heights, 275 N.W.2d at 34.
256. See, e.g., Davis, 111 S.E.2d at 492; Rusthoven, 387 N.W.2d at 644-45;
Atwood, 365 A.2d at 746-47.
257. Wheeler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 9, 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). For
expressions of similar views, see Hall v. American Indemnity Group, 648 So. 2d
556, 559 (Ala. 1994), Home Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, 489 P.2d 244, 247 (Ariz.
1971), Floyd v. Otter Creek Homeowners Association, 742 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1988), Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyer's Mutual Insurance
Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1271 (Cal. 1993), Hitz v. Allied American Mutual Life In-
surance Co., 195 A.2d 446, 448 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1963), E.L du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 686 A.2d 152, 155-56 (Del. 1996), State Farm
Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Deni Associates, Inc., 678 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337, 341 (Idaho
1984), Willison v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 690 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998), Aetna Insurance Co. v. Rodriguez, 504 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 517 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1988), Loyd v. Federal Kemper Life
Assurance Co., 518 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 1994), Farm Bureau Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Old Hickory Casualty Insurance Co., 810 P.2d 283, 286 (Kan. 1991),
Benton v. Long Manufacturing N.C., Inc., 550 So. 2d 859, 860 (La. Ct. App.
1989), Maine Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 665
A.2d 671, 675 (Me. 1995), JMP Associates, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co., 693 A.2d 832, 834 (Md. 1997), Western National Mutual Insurance Co.
v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 269 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. 1978), Dairyland
Insurance Co. v. Implement Dealers Insurance Co., 199 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn.
1972), Peterson v. Continental Boiler Works, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Mo.
1990), Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Bierschenk, 548 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Neb.
1996), Caruso v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 57 A.2d 359, 360
(N.J. 1948), Loya v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 888 P.2d 447, 451 (N.M.
1994), Hickman v. Saunders, 645 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (1996), and Employers Rein-
surance Corp. v. Landmark, 547 N.W.2d 527, 532 (N.D. 1996).
258. See 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 7385 (1976 & Supp.
1998).
259. Board of County Comm'rs v. Colorado Counties Cas. & Property Pool,
888 P.2d 352, 355 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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strue the policy in favor of either of the parties, but should give ef-
fect to the parties' mutual intentions.
If an ambiguity exists as a result of a reading of the policy lan-
guage, the court may resolve the ambiguity by resorting to extrinsic
evidence.26' The insurer must prove not only that the words and ex-
pressions used in the insurance contract are susceptible to the con-
struction sought, but that it is the only reasonable construction that
may fairly be placed on them.262 Courts, in assessing whether the
insurer's interpretation of the policy is the only reasonable one, are
free to look beyond the language of the policy. Relevant considera-
tions may include: (1) the ordinary meaning of the words in ques-
tion; (2) how reasonable persons would construe the words in ques-
tion; (3) availability of clearer language; and (4) the nature, type,
and purpose of the insurance in question.63 If the court determines
that the words and expressions are susceptible to more than one
260. See id.; see also supra note 257 and accompanying text.
261. Both patent and latent ambiguities may arise from the language used
in insurance policies. See C. & A. Constr. Co. v. Benning Constr. Co., 509
S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1974); North Am. Philips Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
No. 88C-JA-155, 1995 Del. Super. LxIs 356, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10,
1995); Hall v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 295 N.W. 204, 206 (Mich. 1940);
Koplin v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 44 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945); Na-
tional Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995).
A patent ambiguity exists when the language on its face is capable of more
than a single interpretation and arises from the use of defective, obscure, or in-
sensible language. See Crown Management Corp. v. Goodman, 452 So. 2d 49,
52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). "Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if the ambi-
guity is patent, because such evidence would, in effect, allow the court to re-
write the contract for the parties by supplying information the parties them-
selves did not choose to include." Id. A latent ambiguity exists when patently
unambiguous language becomes ambiguous when applied. "A latent ambiguity
... is said to exist where a contract fails to specify the rights or duties of the
parties in certain situations and extrinsic evidence is necessary for interpreta-
tion or a choice between two possible meanings." Id.
Although there appears to be some divergence of opinion as to when
parol evidence is properly admitted because of the latent ambiguity-
patent ambiguity dichotomy, the distinction between the type of am-
biguity involved is one of form over substance. The growing and bet-
ter reasoned trend of authority indicates that the introduction of parol
evidence to probe the true intent of the parties is proper, irrespective
of any technical classification of the type of ambiguity present.
Id.
262. See Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981).
"The insurer is 'obliged to show (1) that it would be unreasonable for the aver-
age man reading the policy to (construe it as the insured does) and (2) that its
own construction was the only one that fairly could be placed on the policy.'"
Id. (quoting Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 183 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y.
1962)).
263. See, e.g., Vargas, 651 F.2d at 840-42 (using a number of interpretive
techniques to analyze the contract in question); Jacobs v. Central Sec. Mut. Ins.
Co., 551 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (11l. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining various considera-
tions for the court if faced with an ambiguity).
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meaning and that the insured's construction of same was reason-
able, the rule of ambiguity is applied.
Conflicting interpretations or opposite conclusions from differ-
ent jurisdictions regarding the legal effect or meaning of policy lan-
guage or provisions can also give rise to ambiguity. Thus, the doc-
trine of ambiguity has had a significant impact on the development
of insurance contracts and has been the catalyst for the develop-
ment of insurance policies containing clear and concise words and
expressions. Courts almost universally agree that the words and
expressions of replacement cost provisions are clear and unambigu-
ous.2 As a result, ambiguity has rarely been applied in replace-
ment cost coverage litigation.267
III. THE HUMAN FACTOR
The insurance industry has a valid interest in preventing moral
hazard, unjust enrichment, and fraud. This interest must be bal-
anced against the insured's interest in protecting her property
against possible loss, including depreciation, and the public's inter-
est in maintaining a proper balance between the two. Replacement
cost provisions, for the most part, achieve an acceptable balance be-
tween these often competing interests.
The law of replacement cost coverage is a model of uniformity,
certainty, and predictability. This achievement is to be heralded
because the insurance industry has, for the most part, succeeded in
fashioning a policy provision that, on its face, is virtually immune to
264. See Vargas, 651 F.2d at 839-40; Jacobs, 551 N.E.2d at 1061.
265. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 782 P.2d 727, 732 (Ariz.
1989); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 549 S.W.2d
267, 268 (Ark. 1977); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392,
397 (Mich. 1991); Maddox v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 648,
654, 280 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1981); Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 355
P.2d 742, 746-47 (Or. 1960). But see FDIC v. American Cas. Co., 528 N.W.2d
605, 608 (Iowa 1995) (refusing to follow the view that an ambiguity arises
merely because there is conflicting case authority); Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v.
RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that conflicting ju-
dicial interpretation is a factor that warrants consideration in assessing the
existence of ambiguity, but is in no way dispositive); Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
667 A.2d 617, 624 (Md. 1995) (stating that conflicting judicial interpretation is
a factor that warrants consideration in assessing the existence of ambiguity,
but is in no way dispositive); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 315 S.W.2d 239,
242 (Tenn. 1958) (recognizing that insurance policies will not be automatically
construed against the insurer where judicial construction of the terms is clear);
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1997)
(declining to follow view that an ambiguity arises merely because there is con-
flicting case authority).
266. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
267. But see Sayes v. Safeco Ins. Co., 567 So. 2d 687, 689-90 (La. Ct. App.
1990); Bourrie v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 60, 63 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985).
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legal challenge. Nevertheless, it is possible for a fly to enter the
ointment. That fly is the human factor.
The human factor involves the individual representatives of in-
surance companies and how they conduct themselves during the
sales and distribution of insurance policies and handling of insur-
ance claims. Decisional law imposes upon insurers a contractual
and tort obligation of good faith and fair dealing."8 Breach of the
contractual obligation supports an award of replacement cost pro-
ceeds despite the fact that the condition of actual repair or replace-
ment has not been performed. 9 Good faith and fair dealing, in the
context of the latter obligation, require that insurers exercise rea-
sonable care in dealing with, or otherwise disposing of, insurance
claims. A failure to exercise reasonable care or other opprobrious
conduct on the part of the insurer operates as a catalyst that trans-
forms the breach of contract claim into one sounding in tort.7
268. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156-57
(Alaska 1989).
269. See id. at 1153 & n.1.
270. Several commentators provide a detailed discussion of bad faith and
other possible tort claims that might arise as a result of unreasonable conduct
by the insurer. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH
LITIGATION §§ 1.01-1.08 (1994) (discussing the evolution and development of
the tort of bad faith); PAUL J. SKOK, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO INSURANCE COVERAGE
AND BAD FAITH (1994 & Supp. 1998); DENNIS J. WALL, LITIGATION AND PRE-
VENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH (2d ed. 1994).
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